New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice by Solomon, Jason M.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2010
New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and
the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory
and Practice
Jason M. Solomon
Copyright c 2010 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Solomon, Jason M., "New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and
Practice" (2010). Faculty Publications. Paper 680.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/680
NEW GOVERNANCE, PREEMPTIVE SELF-REGULATION, 
AND THE BLURRING OF BOUNDARIES IN REGULATORY 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
JASON M. SOLOMON* 
In the literature on "new governance" forms of regulation, the 
blurring of traditional boundaries is a pervasive but largely implicit theme. 
This Article makes this theme explicit, and argues that the capacity to blur 
boundaries is one of new governance's signature strengths. New governance 
regulation frequently blurs the roles of regulatory actors, the stages of 
regulation, the modes of regulation, the functions of a regulatory regime; 
and the structure of the regulatory regime. The Article applies this lens to a 
series of case studies, and demonstrates how industry attempts at 
preemptive self-regulation have created opportunities where new 
governance forms of regulation could have emerged. Turning prescriptive, 
this Article calls attention to the political and strategic dynamics around 
attempts to regulate new domains, and calls on policymakers and scholars to 
embrace the blurred boundaries of new governance approaches as a possible 
approach that combines the best of state-centered and self-regulatory forms 
of governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the literature on regulatory theory, visual metaphors abound. 
And John Braithwaite, an Australian and one of the leading regulatory 
scholars in the world, appears to be responsible for many of them. 
In the entry on "Regulation" for the Oxford Handbook of Legal 
Studies, co-authored with Christine Parker, Braithwaite and Parker 
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Thanks to all 
the participants at the Transatlantic Conference on New Governance and the 
Transformation of Law, and particularly David and Louise Trubek for organizing and 
hosting the Symposium at the University of Wisconsin. 
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invoke a series of Russian dolls, one inside the other, to convey the 
different layers of "governance studies" or regulatory theory. 1 In his 
classic work with Ian Ayres, Responsive Regulation, Braithwaite uses a 
pyramid to invoke the continuum from the state-centered, command 
regulation at the tip to self-regulation or none at all at the base, with 
many models in between. 2 In a piece on criminology, Braithwaite 
portrays the night watchman state, sitting alone in a boat, at times 
steering, at times rowing-at times perhaps fed up with being caught in 
the middle of this swirling sea of regulatory categories, and so tossing 
the oars aside and going for a swim. 3 
"New governance," meanwhile, enters the world of regulatory 
theory, uplifted by the rhetoric of newness, 4 and bathed in light. 
Entering the tired debate between regulation and deregulation, new 
governance presents a light at the end of the tunnel, a third way. For 
the regulatory state, new governance represents a "bright future." And 
a recent collection of works on new governance, authored by many at 
this conference, was described by one scholar as a "mosaic that is 
largely ... bright. "5 
In this Article, I aim to shed some light on the use of "new 
governance" in regulatory theory and practice by developing a theme 
which may appear rather dull. The theme plays on a visual metaphor as 
well, that of blurring boundaries. 
Here I use the term "new governance" differently than the way it 
is used in much of the literature, which uses the term "new 
governance" to refer to a specific kind of regulatory approach, 
generally one with particular attributes such as benchmarking, 
transparency and democratic participation. The Open Method of 
1. John Braithwaite & Christine Parker, Regulation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 119, 119-20 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003). 
2. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REsPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 38-39 (1992). 
3. See John Braithwaite, The New Regulatory State and the Transformation 
of Criminology, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 222, 223-24 (2000) (arguing that the new 
regulatory state "holds up state steering and civil society rowing as the ideal"). 
Braithwaite borrows the steering-and-rowing metaphor from Osborne and Gaebler. See 
DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PuBLIC SECTOR 32-35 (1992). 
4. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and The Rise of 
Govemance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 354 (2004) 
("Newness itself becomes the essential substance of the emerging paradigm."). 
5. See Jason M. Solomon, Law and Govemance in the 21st Century 
Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 826 (2008) (reviewing LAW AND NEW 
GoVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gniinne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006), 
and LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TUSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE: MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS (2006)). 
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Coordination (OMC) in the EU is a prime example. For the purposes of 
this Article, I use "new governance" more as a term to describe a 
regulatory strategy or tool-or, as Ayres and Braithwaite use the term 
"responsive regulation" in their book as an "attitude." 
Call it a regulatory state of mind. 
The central argument of the Article is that one of new 
governance's signature strengths is its capacity for blurring boundaries 
in theory and practice. In Part I, I describe how blurring boundaries is 
a theme that pervades the academic literature on new governance, and 
other related third-way forms of regulation. Though the idea of blurring 
boundaries is implicit and mentioned in passing in several works, 6 this 
Article makes the idea explicit and central to discussions of new 
governance. 
With the help of this conceptual frame for thinking about new 
governance, Part II turns to a series of case studies. The case studies 
differ from existing new governance accounts in that they are all "pre-
regulation" -that is, the case studies are of issues that were not subject 
to regulation, and describe how the issues got onto the public agenda, 
and the various pushing and pulling that ensued over how best to 
regulate that particular domain. The purpose of these case studies is to 
demonstrate the opportunities for overlapping regulatory frameworks or 
blurred boundaries on the modes of regulation. Importantly, these case 
studies are ones where new governance did not emerge. I draw out 
lessons from the case studies, and explain what a new governance 
approach in these domains might have looked like. 
In Part III, I sketch the way the political and strategic dynamics 
around the possibility of regulation in these areas can be harnessed to 
blur the boundaries between the roles and functions of public and 
private-sector actors and enable a new governance approach to emerge. 
In understanding how new governance approaches can emerge in the 
context of past episodes, policy-makers can be ready to use such 
approaches on future issues. Doing so can chart a regulatory path that 
blurs the boundary between state-centered and self-regulatory, public 
and private, and might even lead to better policy outcomes going 
forward. 
6. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 4, at 442 ("[T]he obsessive maintenance of 
traditional boundaries-including those of public and private, profit and nonprofit, 
formal and informal, theory and practice, secular and religious, left and right-is no 
longer a major concern with the shift to the Renew Deal paradigm."). 
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I. BLURRING BOUNDARIES AS DESCRIPTIVE REGULATORY THEORY 
In seeking to defme "new governance," scholars have taken a 
number of different approaches. The most common approach is to 
defme it as a "type" or "mode" of regulation and then list a set of 
attributes which make something "new governance" regulation. 7 In this 
Section, I seek to add to typologies like these by positing that "blurring 
boundaries" is an attribute of new governance regulation as well. 
Below I explain how the idea of blurring boundaries pervades new 
governance regulation and thought, before applying the idea to case 
studies in Parts II and III. 
The idea of blurred boundaries is operative in new governance 
theory in several ways, which I describe below. They are: (1) blurring 
the roles of regulatory actors; (2) blurring the stages of regulation; 
(3) blurring the modes of regulation; (4) blurring the funcdons of a 
regulatory regime; and (5) blurring the structure of the regulatory 
regime. Each of these blurred boundaries has been pointed out by other 
scholars. My modest contribution in this Part is to bring them together 
in a unified theme to use as a conceptual frame for the case studies and 
prescriptive advice for policy-makers below. 
Roles. In any regulatory domain, there are generally state actors 
who are doing the regulating, private-sector actors who are being 
regulated, and third-parties who may provide input into how the area 
ought be regulated either because it affects them or their business 
7. Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, though using the term "democratic 
experimentalism," describe it as deploying the private-sector techniques of 
"benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error detection" in service of the 
pragmatic, problem-solving approach to democracy they call "direcdy deliberative 
polyarchy" where a political community makes choices through "tiered governance 
councils-councils that organize service provision with the collaboration of local 
citizens, and pool their experience to inform their separate decisions." Michael C. Dorf 
& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 267, 314, 320 (1998). William Simon describes the "core operating premises of 
Legal Pragmatism," the underlying philosophy behind new governance, as "stakeholder 
negotiation, transparency, and rolling rule regimes." William H. Simon, Solving 
Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. 
& MARY L. REv. 127, 181 (2004). Scott and Trubek describe the key attributes of new 
governance as "participation and power-sharing," "multi-level integration," "diversity 
and decentralisation," "deliberation," "flexibility and revisability," and 
"experimentation and knowledge creation." See Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, 
Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Govemance in the European Union, 8 
EuR. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2002). Also, Orly Lobel's list of the "organizing principles" of the 
new governance model include "participation and partnership," "collaboration," 
"diversity and competition," "decentralization and subsidiarity," "integration of policy 
domains," "flexibility and noncoerciveness (or softness-in-law)," "fallibility, 
adaptability, and dynamic learning," and "law as competence and orchestration." 
Lobel, supra note 4, at 371-404. 
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personally or because they are a nongovernmental organization working 
in the area, or for other reasons. New governance blurs these roles in 
several ways. Regulated entities are involved themselves in setting the 
standards, 8 third parties may be involved in monitoring and 
enforcement, and state actors may serve as facilitators who oversee 
mechanisms for information pooling,9 rather than the experts in 
administrative agencies envisioned when the administrative state began 
(at least in the U.S.). 10 The "private role in public governance" 11 may 
go as far as second-order agreements to implement the regulatory 
standard that in turn operate to change the content of the standard down 
the road. 12 
Stages. The conventional story on regulation involves either the 
formulation of something called "law," which is more or less fixed, 
and can then be "enforced" by state actors trying to maximize 
compliance. Regulated entities either comply or they do not. If they do 
not, they are punished. Or else regulation involves the formulation of 
something called "policy," which involves the balancing of the number 
of factors to inform the way the state approaches a particular issue. 
Once the policy is formulated, the next stage is "implementation." So 
one might, for example, have the United States Congress decide that 
national policy will be that all able-bodied adults must work and will be 
cut off from public assistance after a certain period of time even if they 
cannot fmd work. Then the relevant federal agency will work to 
execute or implement that policy through the states. 
New governance blurs the boundaries between law and 
enforcement, and policy and implementation. 13 To use the example 
8. See Colin Scott, Standard-Setting in Regulatory Regimes, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF REGULATION (R. Baldwin eta!. eds.) (forthcoming July 2010), available 
at http:/ /ssrn.cornlabstract= 1393647. 
9. See generally David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 294 
(2006) (explaining this development). 
10. Another major blurring of roles, of course, has been the performance of 
traditionally governmental services by private entities. For an overview of such 
developments, see GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). For a look at how the 
fmancial crisis led to a new model of privatizing government functions altogether, see 
Stephen M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 464, 535-36 (2009). 
11. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 15 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543 (2000). 
12. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 
COLUM. L. REv. 2029 (2005) (arguing that the role of private actors in the traditional 
government functions of standard-setting, implementation, and enforcement are even 
greater than previously identified). 
13. It may also blur the boundary between law and policy, but that boundary 
may never have been so clear. 
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above, under a new governance approach, it might be that Congress 
sets a goal that all states will maximize the number of able-bodied 
adults who are employed, and it might make available a certain amount 
of money to incentivize states to work towards this goal. Then, the 
states would formulate plans to best achieve this goal, and start to 
follow those plans. After a few years, those plans would be revisited in 
light of experience and learning from benchmarking against peers. 
Under such an approach, it is difficult to tell where policy ends and 
implementation begins. 
Modes. New governance approaches also blur the boundaries 
between modes of regulation. One can think about this by returning to 
Ayres and Braithwaite's regulatory pyramid, which includes 
intermediate approaches such as enforced self-regulation and co-
regulation. 14 Though much of the literature treats new governance as a 
particular mode of regulation that could simply be included as another 
line on the pyramid, new governance might also be a strategy or tool to 
blur boundaries between modes of regulation. 15 One can think about 
this as either using multiple approaches at once, or making it possible 
to move relatively easily from mode to mode as circumstances change. 
This latter point, of course, is the provisional or flexible attribute that 
many new governance theorists emphasize. 16 
Functions. The basic functions of a regulatory regime are 
commonly described as setting standards, monitoring compliance, and 
enforcing noncompliance. To a certain extent, this relates to the 
"stages" of regulation I describe above, but is functional rather than 
temporal. New governance blurs these functions: if the goal is 
continuous improvement in achieving regulatory goals, as laid out 
particularly by Dorf and Sabel by analogy to the private sector, then the 
relevant actors are always working together to better achieve the goal. 17 
Monitoring and enforcement really become one, and the standards are 
14. SeeAYRES&BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 39. 
15. See Kenneth Armstrong & Claire Kilpatrick, Law, Governance, or New 
Govemance? The Changing Open Method of Coordination, 13 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 649, 
652-53 (explaining that new governance can be seen as a regulatory "tool" or 
"instrument"). 
16. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7, at 322-23. This is more of a temporal 
limitation than a blurred boundary. The idea is that both the means and the ends of 
regulation ought be treated as provisional in light of inevitable uncertainty and limited 
knowledge. For discussion in the context of Gunther Teubner's "reflexive law," see 
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1227, 1265 (1994) 
("[R]eflexive law recognizes the cognitive and normative limitations of a legal system 
operating in a complex modern society."). 
17. SeeDorf & Sabel, supra note 7, at 292-314 (explaining how innovation in 
the private sector has increased the problem-solving abilities of firms). 
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frequently revisited during the monitoring process. Again, the full-
employment example is useful here. 
Structure. Regulatory approaches are commonly characterized as 
either centralized or decentralized, or alternatively, oriented 
horizontally or vertically. New governance blurs what are commonly 
seen as binary choices. In the choice between centralized and 
decentralized, new governance is commonly characterized as 
decentralized, but the center plays an important role as well in pooling 
information and perhaps retaining some kind of backstop enforcement 
mechanism. Meanwhile, in federal systems like the U.S. and EU, new 
governance approaches can work both vertically-with the U.S. 
Congress or federal administrative agency, or the EU Commission at 
the top-and horizontally, with states or other subunits learning from 
one another through benchmarking. 
I have explained in this Part how blurring boundaries is a critical 
idea in new governance theory. Though I offer this idea as a modest 
contribution to descriptive regulatory theory, my prediction is that 
blurred boundaries of this kind-whether under the guise of "new 
governance" regulation or not-will be a hallmark of the twenty-first-
century regulatory state. 
I next tum in Part II to a series of case studies to help illuminate 
the possible opportunities for new governance to "scale up," in part 
through a conscious strategy by policy-makers to blur boundaries-a 
strategy I discuss and recommend in Part III. 
II. CASE STUDIES: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW GOVERNANCE 
Having introduced the conceptual frame of blurring boundaries as 
a way of thinking about new governance regulation, this Section turns 
to a series of regulatory case studies that I then analyze in Part III as 
missed opportunities for new governance. 
One question that has arisen in these early stages of the new 
governance literature is what kinds of regulatory domains and what 
kinds of issues, are most likely to lend themselves to new governance 
approaches. Environmental regulation, for example, seems to be the 
locus of many new governance approaches, both in the U.S. and EU. 18 
Dorf and Sabel look at controversies in three broad categories: 
18. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Infonnation-Forcing Regulation and 
Environmental Govemance, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 
293 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Joanne Scott & Jane Holder, Law 
and New Environmental Govemance in the European Union, in LAw AND NEW 
GoVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 211 (Gniinne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 
2006). 
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"conflicts of economic interest, the provision of public services, and 
disputes over rights arising from moral differences. " 19 I have 
previously referred to attempts to address "intractable social problems" 
such as public education or drug treatment in the U.S. as a common site 
for new governance approaches. 20 
Here, I look to a category that may hold particular promise: new 
areas of regulation, that is, issues or industries that have not previously 
been subject to regulation, perhaps because they did not exist. I explain 
more in Part III why this is an area of particular promise, but to 
preview, the pushing and pulling involved in debates about regulating 
new issues may lend itself to blurring boundaries as a means of short-
term political compromise, but with long-term benefits for regulatory 
design. 
As Ed Rubin puts it in his article, "[I]n the United States, 
regulation is typically established in response to a particular economic 
or social problem, the 'problem' being, of course, a socially 
constructed perception. "21 When the problem emerges on the public 
agenda, the potential target of regulation has key strategic choices to 
make in the face of litigation and "legislative threats. "22 The regulatory 
debate frequently takes place in the same regulation-versus-deregulation 
framework that occupies the theoretical literature, and third-way 
options are not always apparent. 
As the case studies below are focused on the regulation of 
particular industries, it should be no surprise that we see the industries 
each used some form of "preemptive self-regulation" to react to 
concern from the public and policy-makers-expressed either through 
potential lawsuits or the threat of increased regulation-by announcing 
that they will do the job of regulation themselves. The aim is to take the 
wind out of the sails of the regulators, and the thrust of much recent 
regulatory scholarship is that this kind of increased reliance on the 
private sector might well be a good thing. 
In that context, I consider three recent case studies in the U.S. of 
new issues that have risen to the public agenda. The case studies deal 
with (1) data privacy and security; (2) the sales and marketing of soda 
to children; and (3) the regulation of speech abroad by Internet service 
providers. In considering these case studies, this Article explores the 
form of self-regulation undertaken by the relevant industries, the 
19. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7, at 284. 
20. See Solomon, supra note 5, at 835. 
21. Edward Rubin, The Regulatizing Process and the Boundaries of New 
Public Governance, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 535, 545 (citation omitted). 
22. See generally Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L. REv. 629 
(2008). 
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regulation that occurred at the state level, and the alternatives that had 
been put forth by policy-makers at the federal level. 
My methodology here is intended as an addition to the existing 
new governance literature. Rather than look at case studies where new 
governance has succeeded or failed, I look at where new governance 
did not arise, but could have. 23 The idea is that these kinds of case 
studies are important in answering the critical questions in the next 
phase of new governance theory about what the circumstances are 
where new governance is most likely to emerge and succeed, and also 
how new governance can scale up more generally. 
A. Data Security24 
In the last decade, the public has become increasingly aware of 
data-security breaches, and the resulting identity theft. 25 Misplaced 
hardware such as backup tapes and hacking attempts and theft by 
employees can all result in the loss of confidential personal 
information. 26 In addition to the loss or theft of physical objects 
containing data, many data breaches occur virtually, through hacking or 
other types of fraud. The organizations that experience these losses 
include state and federal government agencies, retail corporations, 
fmancial institutions, and data brokers.27 
One high-profile example of a data-security breach stemming from 
fraud involved ChokePoint, a company based in Alpharetta, Georgia. 28 
Founded in 1997 as a spin-off from the credit reporting agency 
23. There is an unexplored assumption here that a policy-maker or "policy 
entrepreneur" could have successfully pushed a new governance approach if motivated 
to do so, but did not; certainly this assumption is worth greater exploration. I make no 
attempt to explain why such an approach did not emerge in these cases. 
24. Thanks to Alison Lerner, University of Georgia School of Law, class of 
2010, for drafting the case study that served as the basis for this Section, and Matt 
Weiss, University of Georgia School of Law, class of 2008, for doing much of the 
initial research. 
25. Press Release, Identity Theft Resource Center, Security Breaches (Jan. 8, 
2008), http://www. idtheftcenter. org/artman2/publish/lib _survey /Press_ Release_-_ 2007 
Breach List.shtml. 
- -
26. See generally Paul N. Otto et al., The ChoicePoint Dilemma: How Data 
Brokers Should Handle the Privacy of Personal Jnfom11Jtion, IEEE SECURITY & 
PRivACY, Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 15 (giving general background information on data 
breaches). 
27. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security 
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REv. 913, 920-23 (2007) (categorizing the institutions subject 
to notification laws into four categories: business-to-consumer retail, business-to-
consumer financial, outsourcing entities, and data brokers). 
28. Evan Perez, Identity Theft Puts Pressure on Data Sellers, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 18, 2005, at Bl. 
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Equifax, 29 ChoicePoint is a data broker, serving clients by compiling 
and maintaining billions of profiles on individuals and businesses in the 
United States. 30 
Like other data brokers at the time, ChoicePoint existed in an 
industry largely unregulated, operating outside the boundaries of the 
main federal laws governing data security and privacy, the federal Fair 
Credit Reporting Act and the Privacy Act. 31 Though Congress had 
passed a law in 1999 subjecting fmancial institutions to some degree of 
scrutiny on protecting personal information, data brokers like 
ChoicePoint were not covered by this law either. 32 
The data broker industry had been self-regulating through its trade 
group, the Individual Reference Services Group (IRSG).33 The IRSG 
had propagated a series of data-security guidelines and general 
29. !d. 
30. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable 
Belief at Exhibit C, In re ChokePoint, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 06-198 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 
30, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069com 
plaint. pdf; Perez, supra note 28. 
31. The federal government, through the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
can charge "consumer reporting agencies" with violations of the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA) for data breaches. See Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model 
Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 357, 359-60 (2006) (describing 
the weakness inherent in using the FCRA to handle data-security breach cases). The 
FCRA requires that consumer-reporting agencies institute procedures to ensure 
accuracy, and allows for procedures which have now become familiar, such as the 
ability to access one's credit report and correct mistakes on it. Id at 360. Additionally, 
govermnent agencies are subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, which regulates public 
sector use of confidential information and is modeled after the FCRA. Privacy Act of 
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). Finally, companies under the purview of the SEC may 
face violations of the Exchange Act for data security-breach incidents. See Otto et a!., 
supra note 26, at 17-18. However, data brokers like ChoicePoint are not covered under 
any of these statutes. See id. at 15. 
32. See Grarnm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006). Under 
the 1999 Grarnm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), the financial services industry was subject 
to regulations "to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or 
information which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer." 
!d. § 6801(b)(3) (emphasis added). The relevant agencies released a set of Guidelines 
that required financial institutions to develop and implement a set of procedures to 
protect against the release of confidential personal information. See, e.g., Gideon 
Emcee Christian, A New Approach to Data Security Breaches, 7 CANADIAN J.L. & 
TECH. 149, 155-56 (2009) (describing the GLBA and subsequent agency action); see 
also Ritu Singh, Two-Factor Authentication: A Solution to Times Past or Present? The 
Debate Surrounding the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Security Safeguards Rule and the 
Methods of Risk Assessment and Compliance, 2 I/S: J.L. & PoL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 
761, 763-65 (2006) (discussing the implementation of the Guidelines and the lax 
enforcement and compliance with GLBA). 
33. Individual Reference Services Group, Industry Principles - Commentary 
(Dec. 15, 1997), availableathttp://www.ftc.gov/os/1997112/irsappe.pdf. 
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principles. 34 But the self-regulatory attempts of the industry were weak, 
and not effective in controlling access to confidential information. 
On February 14, 2005, MSNBC.com broke the story that 
individuals had posed as ChoicePoint clients to gain access to 
Choice Point's databases. 35 The article also revealed that fifty fake 
companies had been established to acquire consumer data from 
ChoicePoint and that the breach had likely affected 35,000 consumers 
in California. 36 A few days later, Choice Point publicly acknowledged 
for the first time that this breach had occurred several months prior. 37 
On February 16, the Adanta Journal-Constitution reported that law-
enforcement agents had predicted that the problem extended beyond 
California and likely placed hundreds of thousands of non-Californians 
at risk. 38 On that same day, ChoicePoint acknowledged that it would 
send out 35,000 statements to consumers outside of California notifying 
them of the potential for identify theft due to the 2004 security breach. 39 
The incident spurred a flurry of litigation and legislative action all 
over the country. Several complaints were filed against Choice Point 
asserting several types of claims. It faced a class action lawsuit brought 
by shareholders, 40 and several individual lawsuits. 41 Scrutiny of 
ChoicePoint hit its apex as the company filed a Form 8-K with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) acknowledging ongoing 
government investigations by the SEC and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC). 42 Thirty-eight state attorneys general publicly 
submitted a joint letter to ChoicePoint demanding that it notify residents 
within their state regarding any of their personal information that may 
have been disseminated during the company's security breach. 43 
ChoicePoint eventually reached a settlement with the FTC, in which it 
agreed to pay a $10 million civil penalty, create a $5 million fund to 
34. Comments of the Individual Reference Services Group on Elements of 
Effective Self Regulation for the Protection of Pdvacy and Questions Related to Online 
Privacy Before the U.S. Dep't of Commerce (1998), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
ntiahorne/privacy/rnail/disk/irsgcorn.htrnl. 
35. Bob Sullivan, Database Giant Gives Access to Fake Firms, MSNBC.COM, 
Feb. 14, 2005, http://www.rnsnbc.rnsn.com/id/6969799/. 
36. /d. 
37. Bill Husted, Crooks Duped Data Archive, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 16, 










In re ChoicePoint, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 06-198 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 
Otto et al., supra note 26, at 18. 
ChoicePoint, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 4 (Mar. 4, 2005). 
38 AGs Send Open Letter to ChoicePoint, Assoc. PREss FIN. WIRE, Feb. 
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compensate the victims of identity theft, 44 and supply detailed 
information to the FTC every two months for two years on its 
compliance with data-security measures. 45 
In addition to action against ChoicePoint specifically, the media 
attention to the issue spurred state governments and the federal 
government into taking action on the issue. Some states had passed data 
breach notification laws before the ChokePoint incident. In 2002, a 
security breach had compromised the social security numbers of all 
California state employees. 46 The employees were not informed of the 
problem for several months, and the way the breach was handled led to 
the enaction of the first data-security breach notification law, S.B. 
1386.47 This was the first time that state or federal law required 
notification to the person whose data was compromised. Other states, in 
the wake of increased public awareness on the issue, also enacted data 
breach notification laws. As of 2009, forty-one states and the District of 
Columbia have data breach notification laws. 48 
44. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order For Civil Penalties, Permanent 
Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief, In re ChoicePoint, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 06-198 
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/ 
0523069stip.pdf [hereinafter FTC Consent Order]; Press Release, Federal Trade 
Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in 
Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (Jan. 26, 2006), 
http://www. ftc.gov/opa/2006/01 /choicepoint.shtm. 
45. FTC Consent Order, supra note 44. 
46. See Anthony D. Milewski Jr., Compliance with California Data Privacy 
Laws: Federal Law Also Provides Guidance to Businesses Nationwide, 2 SHIDLER J.L. 
COM. & TECH. 19, 19 (2006). 
47. Id. California Security Breach Notification Act, CAL. Civ. CODE 
§ 1798.82 (West 2009). 
48. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2009); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-
750l(L)(4) (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105(a)(l) (2009); COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-
1-716 (d)(l) (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-70lb(b) (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 12B-102(a) (2009); D.C. CODE § 28-3852(a) (2009); FLA. STAT. § 817.568l(l)(a) 
(2006); GA. CODE. ANN. § 10-1-912 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-2(a) (2009); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-104(5), 28-51-105 (2009); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 530/10 
(2008); IND. CODE§ 24-4.9-3-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.l-2 
(West Supp. 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 50-7a02(a) (2008); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 51: 
3074(a) (West Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN. § 14-3502(A) (LexisNexis 20.09); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.72 
(West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 325E.61, Subdiv. 1, (West 2010); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 407.1500.2 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704(1) (2009); NEB. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 87-803 (LexisNexis 2009); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 603A.220 
(LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:19(V) (YEAR); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
56:8-163(12)(a) (West YEAR); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa.2 (Publisher YEAR); 
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 75-65 (YEAR); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 51-30-02 (YEAR); OHIO REv. 
CoDE ANN. § 1349.19(A)(l)(a) (Publisher YEAR); 2008 H.B. 2245(a) (YEAR) 
(Okla.); OR. REv. STAT. § 646A.604 (2009); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2008); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS§ 11-49.2-3 (Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (Supp. 2009); TENN. 
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The majority of those state laws are primarily modeled after 
California's groundbreak:ing notification law.49 That law required any 
company that stored consumer data electronically to notify any 
California resident impacted by a security breach to the company's 
databases if the company had reason to believe that any unencrypted 
information about the consumer had been accessed by an unauthorized 
individual or entity. 50 That statute required notification "in the most 
expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay . . . . "51 
Failure to provide notice in the event of a breach would result in civil 
liability, including class action lawsuits. 52 The California law provided 
limited exceptions to this requirement. A company could provide 
substitute notice through e-mail, a posting on its Web site, or through 
major statewide media if the cost of providing notice exceeded 
$250,000, the number of consumers impacted exceeded 500,000, or the 
company did not have sufficient contact information to reach the 
impacted consumers individually. 53 
After the ChokePoint incident, members of Congress introduced a 
wave of data breach notification bills. One bill, introduced by 
California Senator Dianne Feinstein, sought to create a strong uniform 
CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(b) (Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202(1)(a) (Supp. 
2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435(b)(l) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(0) 
(2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(1) (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 46A.2A.102 (LexisNexis 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-502(a) (2009). 
49. Compare California Security Breach Notification Act, CAL. Civ. CoDE 
§ 1798.82, with sources cited supra note 48. Other states adopted similar statutes using 
California's legislation as a template but varied based on their definitions of "personal 
information," their notification requirements related to encrypted information, 
conditions necessary to trigger notification requirements, the procedures necessary to 
satisfy actual notice, the situations in which substitute notice was permissible, and the 
timetable for notification, which ranged from a set time period (i.e., forty-five days in 
Florida) to more vague requirements (such as California's requirement to notify 
consumers in the "most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay"). Id. 
50. See GINA MARIE STEVENS ET AL., CoNG. REsEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT 
FOR CONGRESS, DATA SECURITY: FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS (2006), available at 
http: I /assets. openers. corn/rpts/RS2237 4 _ 20060203. pdf. While most states are like 
California in that they require notification when there has been any "unauthorized 
access" of personal information, several states have a higher threshold for when 
notification is triggered: instead of simply unauthorized access, these states require 
some determination of "likelihood of misuse." Schwartz & Janger, supra note 27, at 
932-34. For example, Florida's data-breach law requires disclosure when unauthorized 
access "materially compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal 
information .... "FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 817.5681(4) (West 2006). 
51. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1798.82; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 50. 
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82; CoN G. REsEARCH SERV., supra note 50. 
53. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1798.82(g)(2)-(3); CONG. REsEARCH SERV., supra note 
50. 
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notification requirement, 54 while another bill limited notification to 
cases where there was a "significant risk of identity theft. "55 
Other bills focused on what Cary Coglianese and David Lazer 
have called "management-based regulation. "56 Rather than focusing on 
a notification requirement, these proposals added a requirement that 
companies implement a program to protect data, while leaving the 
specifics to individual companies. 57 A bipartisan bill in the House said 
specifically that the consumer reporter companies to be regulated had to 
utilize "the current state of the art in administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards for protecting" the personal data. 58 None of these 
bills ever became law, and data brokers remain largely unregulated. 59 
54. See Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 115, 109th Cong. 
(2005). The bill also broadened the scope of required disclosures, eliminated any safe 
harbor for disclosed encrypted information, and created additional federal agencies to 
combat identity theft and to oversee statutory compliance. Id. Enforcement authority 
was provided to the state attorneys general, who could sue the companies responsible 
for data breaches for civil remedies. Id. 
55. Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 1326, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(introduced by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.)). 
56. See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based 
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 31 LAw & 
Soc'y REv. 691 (2003) (describing a regulatory approach where firms are directed to 
engage in a planning process designed to achieve public goals). 
57. See, e.g., Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(l) 
(2005) (introduced by Sen. Gordon Smith (R-Or.)). As with Senator Sessions's 
legislation, this bill required the implementation of a program to secure personal 
consumer information through "administrative, technical, and physical safeguards 
... . "/d. The most robust such bill was introduced by, among others, Senators Arlen 
Specter (R-Pa.), and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the Chairman and Ranking Democratic 
Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 
2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill mandated that companies create a personal 
data privacy and security program, id. § 2, based in part on the Interagency Guidelines 
for fmancial institutions, and also set third-party contractors hired to process data, id. § 
502. 
58. Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(B) 
(2005) (DATA) (introduced by Rep. Cliff Stearns (R-Fla.). DATA required 
establishing a policy for information collection, appointing a data-security officer within 
the organization, taking preventative and corrective action, and creating a process for 
the disposal of obsolete data. /d. § 2(a)(2). In the case of a breach, the FTC would then 
be authorized to require the data broker to submit its information protection policy to an 
FTC audit. Id. § 2(b). 
59. See posting of Jeffrey D. Neuburger & Sara Krauss to Privacy L. Blog, 
Will Congress Enact Data Security Breach Provisions This Year - ? Guess IWlat, It 
Already Has, http: //privacylaw. proskauer. corn/2009/03/articles/security-breach 
-notification-1/will-congress-enact-data-security-breach-provisions-this-year-guess-what 
-it-already-has/ (Mar. 2, 2009) (noting that while Congress never actually passed data-
security laws, changes to HIP AA require notification when health information is 
released without authorization). 
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The state notification laws-now the primary means of 
regulation-have their critics. The strict-liability nature of some of the 
state notification laws has come under criticism for requiring 
notification even when a breach may pose no actual threat to the 
consumer.60 Overly ambitious notification laws, which require 
notification for almost any type of breach, may lead to "envelope 
triviality," a term which describes the phenomenon in which consumers 
begin to disregard data breach notices as just another piece of junk mail 
because so many of them arrive in the mail. 61 
In the case of data security, when the legislative smoke cleared 
after the ChokePoint and other incidents, the data-broker industry was 
left largely unregulated. Though subject to varying notification laws in 
different states ex post, there was no governmental push to improve 
security and minimize the risk of breach ex ante. Perhaps, though, the 
notification laws are all that is needed. It may be that the reputational 
sanction of having to notify thousands of individuals of any breach 
provides the necessary incentive for firms to invest in security 
programs that will minimize the chances of such breach from recurring. 
One key lesson of experimentalism (let alone the recent financial 
crisis), of course, is that we just do not know. We do not know how 
technology and other changes in the data-broker industry are going to 
affect the likelihood of breach. We do not know whether and in what 
circumstances a combination of market incentives and self-regulation 
are going to be sufficient. And we do not know when another high-
profile incident will galvanize public attention sufficiently to make any 
kind of regulation even possible. 
This is where the ability to blur boundaries among modes of 
regulation, at the time when the issue is of high public salience, can be 
quite useful. 
Consider how a new governance approach might have worked in 
the case of ChokePoint and its aftermath. Congress could have passed 
a law directing the FTC to work with industry and consumer groups to 
establish preliminary standards for companies' data-security programs, 
based perhaps on the existing interagency guidelines for fmancial 
institutions. Then the law could have enlisted the existing industry self-
60. Christopher J. Volkmer, Risk Allocation by Legislation: Proposed State 
Laws Allocate Costs of Data Breaches, 2 PRIVACY & DATA SEC. L.J. 764, 768-69 
(2007). 
61. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 27, at 952. Another critique of the current 
crop of state and federal data notification laws is that it is impossible for businesses to 
comply with a patchwork of state law plus federal regulation. Even without the federal 
legislation on the table, businesses today must be aware of forty-two subtly different 
notification laws, plus any applicable federal regulations under the FfC, SEC, and 
HIPAA. 
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regulation mechanism, the IRSG, for benchmarking going forward, 
while giving consumer groups a formal seat at the table in making sure 
that companies were continuing to work towards achieving the 
standards. The FTC might issue periodic reports on companies' 
progress as an additional spur for improvement. 62 
By building in a mechanism for periodically revisiting the 
standards, and giving the FTC authority to take punitive action against 
companies that are fallen seriously short, Congress could build in 
blurred boundaries such that the regulatory regime could move to a 
more "top-down" approach if needed, and without the need for more 
regulatory authority. 
B. Childhood Obesity and Sugar-Sweetened Beverages63 
In 2001, the Surgeon General issued a "call to action" on the 
problem of obesity. 64 Though he defined the problem as severe among 
people of all ages, there was a particular focus on the rapid rise in 
obese children and what could be done about it. 65 The Surgeon 
General's recommendations, as well as the rest of the Bush 
administration's reaction in the months to follow, focused in part on 
encouraging exercise in schools and healthier eating.66 The response of 
the Congressional majority followed similar lines, with legislation to 
fund exercise programs, obesity-related research, and educational 
programs to encourage good nutrition. 67 
This case study focuses on the issue of sugar-sweetened beverages 
(SSBs), including sodas, fruit juices, and sports drinks, contributing to 
childhood obesity in the United States. 
At the time of the Surgeon General's call to action, existing federal 
regulation of the sale of SSBs in schools was, and is, slight, falling 
62. Another model can be found in Schwartz and Janger's article. Id at 960-
70 (proposing a coordinated response agent (CRA) that will be more comprehensive 
than simple notification laws). 
63. Thanks to Rachel Goodrich, University of Georgia School of Law, class 
of 2010, for drafting the case study on which this Section is based. 
64. See THE SURGEON GENERAL'S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND 
DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY (2001), available at 
http://www. surgeongeneral. gov /topics/obesity /calltoaction/CalltoAction. pdf. 
65. See id. at 19-21. 
66. See id at 33-35. 
67. See also Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-265, 118 Stat. 729. The Act requires local educational institutions using the 
National School Lunch Program to establish local wellness policies setting forth 
"nutrition guidelines ... for all foods available on each school campus under the local 
educational agency during the school day with the objectives of promoting student 
health and reducing childhood obesity .... " /d. § 204(a)(2). 
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under the Child Nutrition Act, which authorizes the Secretary of 
Agriculture to regulate "competitive foods"-foods and beverages sold 
in competition with the National School Lunch Program and the 
National School Breakfast Program. 68 Such foods are only permitted if 
state and local governments ban the sale of "foods of minimal 
nutritional value" in the lunchroom while meals are served.69 Federal 
regulations identify soda as a food of minimal nutritious value. 70 
The beverage industry has vigorously resisted regulation of SSBs 
for years. For example, the National Soft Drink Association (NSDA), a 
national trade organization of soft drink manufacturers and sellers, 
successfully challenged the sale-of-competitive-foods regulations in 
1983 as an unauthorized time-place restriction. 71 Over the next few 
decades, though, as state regulation of SSBs increased, the beverage 
industry began to change their approach. 
In 2002, the NSDA issued press releases arguing for increased 
physical activity in schools. 72 These press releases argued that sodas did 
not have a role in childhood obesity and championed the "value of 
business-school partnerships. "73 Diverging from the industry's 
approach, Coca-Cola established Model Guidelines for School 
Partnerships in 2003, which on the one hand advocated removing soft 
drinks from elementary schools, but on the other hand allowed for sales 
to older students. 74 Additionally, the guidelines were voluntary both for 
schools and suppliers, there was no enforcement of the guidelines, and 
there was no way to confirm adherence to the guidelines. 75 
The American Beverage Association, a representative organization 
of "beverage producers, distributors, franchise companies and support 
industries, "76 disseminated a vending machine policy for schools in 
2005.77 The policy recommended that (1) only water and 100 percent 
juice be provided in elementary schools, (2) non-diet soft drinks and 
68. 42 u.s.c. § 1779(b) (2006). 
69. Nat'l Soft Drink Ass'n v. Block, 721 F.2d 1348, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
70. National School Lunch Program, General Purpose and Scope, 7 C.P.R. 
pt. 210, app. B(a)(1) (2009). 
71. Nat'l Soft Drink Ass'n, 721 F.2d at 1351. 
72. Michelle M. Mello et al., The Interplay of Public Health Law and 
Industry Self-Regulation: The Case of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Sales in Schools, 98 
AM. J. Pus. HEALTH 595, 597 (2008) (quoting a 2002 National Soft Drink Association 
statement on efforts to ban or restrict the sale of carbonated soft drinks in schools). 
73. Id. (citation omitted). 
74. Id. 
75. ld. 
76. American Beverage Association, About ABA: History, 
http://www.ameribev.org/about-aba/history/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
77. Mello et al., supra note 72, at 600. 
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juice drinks with less than 5 percent juice be removed from middle 
schools, (3) and that a maximum of 50 percent soft drinks be available 
in high school vending machines. 78 Not only was this policy short lived, 
but it was also non-binding during its tenure. 79 The policy was issued 
simply as the industry's view of what is appropriate for beverage sales 
in schools. 80 The policy contained no enforcement mechanism or system 
to monitor adherence. 81 
In 2004, President Bill Clinton underwent quadruple bypass 
surgery, which at least one journalist surmised prompted his 
involvement in the fight on fat. 82 The William J. Clinton Foundation 
and the American Heart Association formed the Alliance for a Healthier 
Generation (Alliance) in 2005, "to create a healthier generation by 
addressing one of the nation's leading public health threats-childhood 
obesity. "83 In 2006, the Alliance announced an agreement with 
Cadbury-Schweppes, Coca-Cola, and PepsiCo to minimize the sales of 
SSBs in schools.84 The Alliance agreement ordered a phase-out of SSB 
sales in schools and specified portion sizes.85 Unlike prior industry self-
regulation efforts, the Alliance agreement provided mechanisms for 
monitoring adherence to the guidelines. 86 The Alliance set a goal for the 
beverage guidelines to be 100-percent implemented by the 2009-2010 
school year. 87 
While the beverage industry made an overture to regulation via the 
Alliance agreement, the agreement remains less restrictive than some 
state and local regulation. 88 The only binding provision of the 
agreement is that the companies support assessing the effect of the new 
policy. 89 Beverage companies do not pledge to stop working with 
bottlers who fail to follow the guidelines. 90 The guidelines do not affect 
78. /d.; see American Beverage Association, Beverage Industry School 
Vending Policy, available at http://www .ia-sb.org/assets/2246ADC4-FBD1-46 
C7-9631-92091CBB4538.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Vending Policy]. 
79. Mello et al., supra note 72, at 600. 
80. /d. 
81. Id.; see Vending Policy, supra note 78. 
82. Jeffrey Kluger, How Bill Put the Fizz in the Fight Against Fat, TIME, 
May 15, 2006, at 22, 22. 
83. Alliance for a Healthier Generation, About the Alliance, 
http://www.healthiergeneration.org/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
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existing beverage contracts, only those signed going forward. 91 
Notably, enforcement mechanisms have been non-existent in the 
industry's self-regulation efforts. 92 
The same year as the Alliance agreement with the beverage 
companies, Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) along with a bipartisan 
coalition, proposed stronger federal regulation. 93 Harkin's proposal 
included requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to update the thirty-
year-old federal nutrition standards for foods of minimal nutritional 
value. 94 Additionally, the scope of application would be broadened 
beyond the cafeteria and into the hallways and school gymnasiums by 
prohibiting the sale of snack foods anywhere on campus and throughout 
the entire school day that do not meet the new nutrition standards. 95 At 
the same time, Congresswoman Lynn Woolsey (D-Cal.) introduced 
identical legislation in the House of Representatives. 96 The American 
Medical Association and the Parent Teacher Association endorsed the 
legislation, 97 but both of the 2006 bills died in committee and met the 
same fate when reintroduced in the House and the Senate in 2007.98 
Meanwhile, activity has continued at the state and local level, as 
well as with industry self-regulation. State and local governments have 
taken steps to limit or ban the sale of soda in schools.99 California has 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. See Child Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act of 2006, 
S. 2592, 109th Cong. (2006). 
94. Id. § IO(b)(1)(A). 
95. Id. § IO(b)(1)(B). 
96. See Child Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act of 2006, 
H.R. 5167, 109th Cong. (2005). 
97. U.S. Senator Tom Harkin, Senator Harkin's Health and Wellness Update: 
Harkin Pushes Bipartisan Measure to Improve Kids Health, April 2006 (on file with 
author). 
98. S. 934: Child Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection Act of 
2009, GOVTRACK. us, http: I lwww. govtrack. us/ congress/bill. xpd?bill = s 111-934&tab = re 
lated (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (discussing the legislative history of the Child 
Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection legislation in the current Senate bill 
934, and previous House and Senate bills S. 771, H.R. 1363, S. 2592, H.R. 5167). 
Woolsey and Harkin again introduced the bills in 2009. Deborah Lehmann, School 
Lunch Talk, Harkin Introduces School Food Bill in Senate, http://www.school 
foodpolicy.com/2009/05/06/harkin-introduces-school-food-bill-in-senate/ (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2010). 
99. In 1993, the West Virginia Board of Education regulated competitive 
foods with some of the highest standards in the nation. Prevention Institute for the 
Center for Health Improvement, Competitive Foods, in NuTRITION PoLICY PROFILES 
(2002), http: I /www. preventioninstitute. org/component/jlibrary /article/id-202/127 .html# 
eight (click on "Competitive Foods" under "Associated File(s)"). In 2003, Arkansas 
banned vending machines accessible to elementary school students. See Act 1220, 2003 
Ark. Acts 4226, 4230. Colorado, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Washington followed 
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been a leading state in such regulation and since 1979 has required that 
at least 50 percent of the foods and beverages sold at school during the 
school day meet nutrition standards. 100 Los Angeles County prohibited 
sales of sodas in all of its schools in 2004, and the Philadelphia School 
District has banned beverage sales other than 100 percent juice, water, 
milk, and "electrolyte replacement" drinks. 101 
The upshot of the attention to childhood obesity in the United 
States in the early part of the decade, then, has been a scattershot 
approach. On the one hand, "scattershot" is a pejorative term, but 
"decentralized" or Hayekian "spontaneous order" are not. Perhaps the 
efforts of civil society (like Bill Clinton's foundation), and state and 
local governments, are making as much progress or more on the issue 
of childhood obesity than could have been achieved with federal 
regulation. 
It is likely, though, that a national, new governance kind of 
approach could achieve greater progress. Such an approach could blur 
the boundary between centralized and decentralized regulation by 
having the Surgeon General use the bully pulpit, and the U.S. 
Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture be both the 
sites of information-pooling and the source of funds for states to put 
into place initiatives to address these issues. It would be decentralized 
and horizontal, though, by placing the onus on the states to come up 
with the mechanisms and participate in the benchmarking to address the 
issue of childhood obesity. 
This approach could work much like the Obama Administration's 
current "Race to the Top" initiative to spur greater efforts and 
educational improvement on the states. Under that initiative, the 
Department of Education has made available millions of dollars to 
states for educational improvement, but conditioned the funds on the 
use of data to drive such improvement, including the use of student 
achievement measures to evaluate teachers. 
Similarly, the federal government could make available money for 
states to promote exercise among kids and put healthy foods in the 
schools, but condition the money on measures to take sugar-sweetened 
beverages out of the schools. States could be required to submit plans 
Arkansas with bans on school vending machines in 2004. National Conference of State 
Legislatures, Vending Machines in Schools 2005, http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/ 
health/vendingmachinesinschools2005/tabid/ 14108/ default .aspx. 
100. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 38,085 (West 2009). More recently and with specific 
regard for beverage sales in schools, California enacted the Pupil Nutrition, Health, and 
Achievement Act of 2001 to take effect in 2006. The Pupil Nutrition, Health, and 
Achievement Act of 2001, ch. 913, § 2, 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5734, 5736 (West 
2001) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49,431.5 (West 2006)). 
101. Mello et al., supra note 72, at 596. 
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for making progress on childhood obesity-plans to be formulated with 
the participation of parents and public health agencies-and be required 
to report regularly on progress. Bill Clinton's Alliance for a Healthier 
Generation could play a role in monitoring. In this way, continuous 
improvement towards the goal of decreasing childhood obesity could be 
built into the regulatory regime so that the momentum from public 
attention is not lost as other issues move on to the public agenda. 
C. Censorship, the Intemet, and China 102 
In the 1990s, countries that had speech restrictions on journalists 
and reporters extended them to cover Internet content. North Korea, 
Iran, Burma, Turkey, Egypt, Cuba, China, and several other countries 
aggressively censor the Internet, and many dissidents and bloggers have 
landed in jail as a result. China has the most sophisticated and extensive 
methods for controlling its citizens' access to the Internet. 103 The 
government's controls are so complete that many in the press and in the 
industry speak of the "Great Firewall of China." 104 Private 
organizations devoted to free speech in the United States, as well as 
government-funded organizations like Radio Free Asia and Voice of 
America, began instituting anti-jamming technology and other methods 
in an attempt to counteract the efforts of the Chinese government. 105 
Public awareness, including the attention of Congress, began to 
grow after a few highly publicized incidents in which Chinese 
dissidents were jailed, as well as because of the increasingly strict 
regulations implemented by the Chinese govemment. 106 However, what 
102. Thanks to Alison Lerner, University of Georgia School of Law, class of 
2010, for her excellent work in drafting the case study that served as the basis for this 
Section. 
103. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "RACE TO THE BOTTOM": CORPORATE 
COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/08/09/race-bottom [hereinafter RAcE TO THE 
BOTTOM). 
104. See id. at 9. 
105. Andrew W. Lloyd, Increasing Global Demand for an Uncensored 
lntemet-How the U.S. Can Help Defeat Online Censorship by Facilitating Private 
Action, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 318 (2008); lntemet Anti-Jamming 
Technology Companies Reach Milestone Agreement, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 18, 2006. 
106. In 2002, the Chinese government implemented filtering software based on 
keywords, which greatly increased its ability to control content. Jill R. Newbold, 
Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S. Corporations for Selling China Intemet 
Tools to Restrict Human Rights, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & PoL'Y 503, 511 (2003). In 
2003, President Hu Jintao took office, and restrictions on speech tightened further. See 
RACE TO THE BoTTOM, supra note 103, at 3. In 2004, the government jailed Shi Tao, a 
prominent anti-government blogger, in a highly publicized incident that created an 
outcry in the media around the world. /d. at 32; Information Supplied by Yahoo! 
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became clear in 2005 and 2006 was that U.S.-based Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) were actively complying with the Chinese 
government's restrictions on speech, essentially counteracting the 
efforts of the U.S. government and the various non-profit and 
university-affiliated organizations that were actively engaged in 
attempts to bring down the firewa11. 107 
Essentially, when the Chinese and other governments asked U.S. 
companies like Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Cisco for help, the 
companies listened. Acting under the reasonable assumption that when 
operating in a foreign country, they were obligated to follow local 
laws, 108 they generally complied with the requests from foreign 
governments. One of the earliest such examples is the prosecution by 
the French government of Yahoo! for hosting an online auction of Nazi 
memorabilia, a practice which is banned in France. 109 Though Yahoo! 
vigorously denied the ability of the French government to control its 
conduct in this way, since its servers are located in California, it 
eventually voluntarily changed its policy and blocked the auctions. 110 
Helped Journalist Shi Tao Get 10 Years in Prison, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, 
Sept. 6, 2005, http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=article&id_article=14884. In 2005, the 
Chinese government created yet more regulations, this time affecting news providers, 
dubbed "Internet News Information Sources" that significantly tightens the existing 
censorship requirements and took direct aim at companies like Google, Yahoo!, and 
MSN. Kaydee Smith, A Global First Amendment?, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
509, 514 (2008) (citation omitted); see generally Trina K. Kissel, License to Blog: 
Intemet Regulation in the People's Republic of China, 17 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 
229 (2007) (providing an excellent overview of the dynamics of Chinese censorship and 
China's legal foundation allowing it). 
107. Rachel Laing, Hitting Wall in China, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 15, 
2006; see generally Lloyd, supra note 105. 
108. See William J. Cannici, Jr., The Global Online Freedom Act: A Critique 
of its Objectives, Methods, and Ultimate Effectiveness Combating American Businesses 
That Facilitate Internet Censorship in The People's Republic of China, 32 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 123, 157-62 (2007) (discussing the role of corporations China and the 
companies' defenses to accusations of complicity). 
109. For a discussion of the case, see JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO 
CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 1-12 (2006). 
110. Yahoo! brought the French government's requests to federal court in the 
United States to determine if they were enforceable in the U.S., but the court handily 
ducked the issue by declaring it moot-since Yahoo! had already complied with the 
order, without further action by the French government, there was no case. See Yahoo! 
Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L 'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 
2006). Yahoo! also came under fire in the mid-2000s for releasing information that 
ultimately lead to the arrest and imprisonment of the Chinese dissidents Li Zhi in 2003 
and Shi Tao in 2004. See Tom Zeller Jr., Intemet Fim1s Facing Questions About 
CensoringOnlineSearchesinChina, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,2006, atC3. SeealsoRAcE 
TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 103, at 107-10; Information Supplied by Yahoo! Helped 
Journalist Shi Tao Get 10 Years in Prison, supra note 106. In addition to the disclosure 
to Chinese authorities of personal identifying information, Yahoo! also engages in the 
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Microsoft and Google have also come under fire for their actions. 
Microsoft admits that it complies with Chinese government speech laws 
by censoring searches through its MSN portal. 111 Additionally, in 
December of 2005, Microsoft shut down the blog of Chinese critic and 
dissident Zhao Jing in the midst of a scandal in which Chinese 
authorities were cracking down on the Beijing News. 112 Google's 
activities in the Chinese market came into the public eye when it 
launched Google.cn in January 2006, the Chinese-language version of 
the widely used search engine. 113 It explicitly de-lists Web sites that fail 
to comply with Chinese government law, though its list of blocked 
terms was developed internally by Google employees, rather than 
imposed from above by the Chinese government. 114 
The U.S. government reaction to both the Chinese government and 
the corporations who have complied with its restrictions has proceeded 
in fits and starts. During the 1990s, the U.S. government devoted some 
energy toward breaching the great firewall through Broadcasting Board 
of Governors, which oversees the International Broadcasting Bureau 
(IBB), Radio Free Asia, and the Voice of America. These organizations 
function as reporting agencies and the IBB "works to serve as . . . a 
free and professional press" to distribute information around the 
globe. 115 However, these efforts were not significantly funded, and as 
the awareness of Chinese censorship grew, Congress began to get 
interested. 
On September 19, 2002, the House Policy Committee released a 
now oft-cited policy statement entitled, "Tear Down This Firewall. " 116 
It described the various abuses that had been documented by groups 
such as Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights Watch in 
repressive regimes, such as denying ISP access, censoring Internet 
practice of de-listing Web sites in compliance with Chinese government speech laws, 
which means that certain Web sites are simply unavailable on Yahoo!'s Chinese-
language search engine. See RAcE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 103, at 26. 
111. Andrew Donaghue, Microsoft Censors Chinese Blogger, ZDNET UK, Jan. 
4, 2006, http:/ /news.zdnet.co. uk/security/0, 1000000189 ,39245583,00.htm. 
112. RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 103, at 43-44. 
113. /d. at 55; Google to Censor Results on New Chinese Search Site, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 25, 2006, at D10. 
114. RAcE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 103, at 55; Google to Censor Results on 
New Chinese Search Site, supra note 113. 
115. Broadcasting Board of Governors, About the Agency, 
http://www.bbg.gov/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010); Lloyd, supra note 
105. 
116. House Policy Committee, Policy Statement, Establishing Global Internet 
Freedom: Tear Down This Firewall, Sept. 19, 2002, available at 
http:/ /web.archive.org/web/20021 01401 0556/http:/ /policy .house. gov/html/news _item.c 
fm?id= 112 [hereinafter Tear Down This Firewall]. 
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content, using cost-prohibitive pricing of e-mail accounts, and banning 
personal computer ownership. 117 The report listed several countries that 
are considered the worst offenders, noting that the People's Republic of 
China "commits the most Internet abuses. " 118 It concludes by offering 
several policies that would form the basis of the legislation introduced 
on February 14, 2006, the Global Internet Freedom Act (GIFA). 119 
GIFA's stated goal was, among other things, to "developD and 
deployO technologies to defeat Internet jamming and censorship. " 120 It 
defines jamming to include not only actual jamming software, but also 
"censoring, blocking, monitoring, or restricting Internet access and 
content by using technologies such as firewalls, filters, and 'black 
boxes."' 121 Additionally, the bill cites the First Amendment and Article 
19 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
support for its prescriptions. 122 
To counteract jamming, the bill proposed creating an Office of 
Global Internet Freedom (OGIF) within the International Broadcasting 
Bureau, which would be charged with developing a "comprehensive 
global strategy to combat state-sponsored and state-directed Internet 
jamming .... "123 It also pledged money and support to private anti-
jamming efforts, which would presumably go to the four primary 
companies engaged in those efforts. 124 
GIF A was introduced several times between 2002 and 2006, but 
never went anywhere. On February 14, 2006, the last time that GIFA 
was introduced, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced 
the creation of the global Internet Freedom Task Force within the State 
Department. 125 The task force released its strategy statement in 
December 2006, which highlighted its three-prong approach: 
monitoring, responding to threats, and advancing Internet freedom. 126 
117. /d. 
118. /d. 
119. After the initial introduction of the Global Internet Freedom Act in 2002, 
it was subsequently introduced twice more but failed to be made into law. See H.R. 
4741: Global Internet Freedom Act, GOVTRACK.US http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill =h109-4741&tab=related (discussing successive Senate and House bills) 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2010). 
120. Global Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 4741, 109th Cong. § 4(a) (2006). 
121. /d.§ 6. 
122. /d. § 2(1). 
123. /d. § 4(a); see supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the IBB). 
124. H.R. 4741 § 3(5); see supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing 
of private anti-jamming companies). 
125. U.S. Department of State, Internet Freedom, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ 
cip/c17156.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
126. Smith, supra note 106, at 518. 
2010:591 Regulatory Theory and Practice 615 
Though some have praised its approach as "responsible, " 127 others have 
noticed that it got off to a "bumpy start" and has not appeared to 
accomplish much in its time in existence. 128 
The creation of GIF A was no accident. The next day, the 
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International 
Operations, and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House 
Committee on International Relations held a joint hearing entitled, "The 
Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?" 129 At this 
hearing, representatives from Google, Yahoo!, Cisco, and Microsoft 
submitted to a thorough grilling by congressional representatives. 
Representative Chris Smith (R-N.J.) said the companies were engaged 
in a "sickening collaboration, decapitating the voice of the 
dissidents. "130 He also compared the company's actions to IBM's 
relationship with the Nazi government, in which IBM provided the 
Third Reich with punch card technology and organizational systems that 
helped them automate much of their activities. 131 
The industry defended its actions, claiming that without guidance 
from Congress, it had no choice but to comply with the local laws of 
whatever country it was operating in. 132 Some emphasized the need for 
compromise with foreign governments. Bill Gates spoke publicly the 
day after the hearing arguing that, "I don't think that a [rule] that said 
you shouldn't do business in some place whose standards aren't 
identical to the US would work .... Germany bans Nazi hate speech-
the US clearly constitutionally protects that. Should I do business in 
Germany?" 133 
However, though the ISP companies spent most of their time at the 
hearing defending their actions and calling for guidance, one of the 
biggest proposals to come out of the hearing was a call for "leadership 
by the corporations to develop a code of conduct which would spell out 
how they could operate in China . . . while not harming citizens and 
127. /d. 
128. Greg Piper, Google, Yahoo Support "Independent Monitoring" of Foreign 
Practices, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, May 21, 2008. 
129. The Intemet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and Intemational 
Operations and the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. on 
Intemational Relations, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Hearing]. 
130. /d. at 2 (statement of Rep. Smith). 
131. /d. 
132. /d. at 65-76 (statement of Elliot Schrage, Vice President for Corporate 
Communications & Public Affairs, Google, Inc.). 
133. Richard Waters, Gates Suggests US Law to Guide on Intemet Censorship 
Abroad, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 16, 2006, at 6 (alteration in original). 
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respecting human rights. "134 Additionally, Representative Smith talked 
about the legislation he was planning to introduce on this issue, the 
Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA). 135 
The day after the joint hearing, February 16, Representative Smith 
introduced GOFA, which built off GIFA, but was substantially broader 
in focus. 136 Its mission is "[t]o promote freedom of expression on the 
Internet, to protect United States businesses from coercion to participate 
in repression by authoritarian foreign governments, and for other 
purposes. " 137 Once the scope of the problem with corporate interaction 
abroad became known, GIFA's tactic of funding anti-jamming efforts 
suddenly appeared insufficient. Like the earlier GIF A legislation, 
GOFA would create an Office of Global Internet Freedom (OGIF), but 
GOFA locates it inside the State Department and gives it some of the 
same duties as the recently announced GIF A. 138 The shift in location of 
the OGIF, from the IBB to the State Department, likely represents a 
growing awareness of the sovereignty issues that are implicated. The 
OGIF would consult with ISP companies, human rights organizations, 
and academic organizations to develop the type of "voluntary code of 
minimum corporate standards related to Internet freedom" that was 
discussed in the congressional hearing. 139 
GOFA never got out of committee. 140 It was re-introduced by 
Representative Smith in January of 2007 and reported by the committee 
in October of 2007, but no action was taken at that time. It was placed 
on the House calendar in February of 2008, but so far, no action has 
been taken on it. 141 
After the introduction of GOFA, the ISP companies began working 
in close collaboration with organizations like the Center for Democracy 
and Technology (CDT) and the Berkman Center, and with various 
politicians who had worked on GOFA, to develop the voluntary code of 
conduct. 142 However, as 2007 passed and no code of conduct was 
134. 2006 Hearing, supra note 129, at 4 (statement of Rep. Smith). 
135. /d. 
136. Global Online Freedom Act, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006). 
137. /d. 
138. ld § 104. 
139. ld § 104(b)(6). 
140. H.R. 4780: Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-4780 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
141. H.R. 275: Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hll0-275 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
142. Greg Piper, Internet Conduct Code Ready in "Months," Yahoo's Yang 
Says, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Apr. 4, 2008. 
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released, pressure from the media and from politicians began mounting 
on companies to take action. 143 
Finally, on May 20, 2008, the Subcommittee on Human Rights 
and the Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing entitled, 
"Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of 
Law." 144 At this hearing, Senator Durbin announced that lawmakers 
will "no longer . . . tolerate the delay" on the voluntary code of 
conduct. 145 Human Rights Watch argued that the primary hold-up on 
the code has been over who will monitor U.S. ISP company activity 
abroad. 146 Organizations like Human Rights Watch (HRW), Reporters 
Without Borders, and the Berkman Center had advocated for 
independent monitoring, while the ISP companies insisted that self-
monitoring was preferable. 147 HRW indicated that Google was the most 
intransigent of the ISP companies, though all were resistant to the idea 
of outside monitoring. 148 HRW proposed that the government create a 
system of compliance rules and penalties that ISP companies should 
follow in addition to the voluntary code, modeled after the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). 149 However, not all the human rights 
and Internet freedom nonprofits were in agreement: the Berkman 
Center supported the process of a voluntary code of conduct, and did 
not believe that any legislation would be effective under the current 
circumstances. 150 
However, the ISP companies and some others defended their 
progress, with the CDT announcing that it felt "hopeful that we are 
close to reaching our goal" 151 and noted that the talks had already lead 
to changes in the way the companies operate-for example, Google had 
begun alerting users in China when results from their searches had been 
143. /d. 
144. Global Intemet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, !lOth Cong. (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Hearing]. 
145. /d. at 3 (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
146. /d. at 10-12 (statement of Arvind Ganesan, Director, Business and Human 
Rights Program, Human Rights Watch). 
147. /d. 
148. /d. at 12. 
149. /d. Bill Gates himself, actually, suggested modeling legislation on the 
FCPA. Waters, supra note 133. The FCPA works by requiring that companies put 
systems in place to prevent abuses, and then holds them accountable when abuses 
occur. /d. 
150. 2008 Hearing, supra note 144, at 119 (statement of John G. Palfrey, Jr., 
Clinical Professor of Law and Executive Director, Berkman Center for Internet & 
Society, Harvard Law School). 
151. /d. at 115 (statement of Leslie Harris, President and CEO, Center for 
Democracy & Technology). 
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censored, and Yahoo! and MSN quickly followed their lead. The 
meeting ended with Senator Durbin imploring or threatening Google to 
speed up the progress on the code of conduct. 152 
Finally, in October of 2008, the ISP companies announced the 
creation of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a self-described 
"multi-stakeholder group of companies, civil society organizations 
(including human rights and press freedom groups), investors and 
academics" whose goal is "to protect and advance freedom of 
expression and privacy in the [information and communications 
technologies] sector .... " 153 The primary substance of the GNI's work 
as of this writing was the creation of three "core documents" which 
represent the three "core commitments" of the GNI. 154 These three 
documents are titled Principles, Implementation Guidelines, and the 
Govemance, Accountability & Leaming Framework. 155 
The Principles document reiterates the GNI' s commitment to 
freedom of expression and privacy, which it defines as basic human 
rights. 156 It also commits itself to "responsible company decision-
making," "multi-stakeholder collaboration," and "governance, 
accountability and transparency." 157 It defmes freedom of expression 
"using Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). " 158 In turn, the UDHR defmes freedom of 
expression very broadly, including the "freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. "159 
The Implementation Guidelines are more detailed, and are 
designed to provide more concrete guidance for companies on how to 
conduct their operations. 160 However, these guidelines are still 
extremely general: participant companies "should" use "human rights 
impact assessments," which should be adapted over time in response to 
152. 2006 Hearing, supra note 129, at 34-35 (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
153. Global Network Initiative, http://www .globalnetworkinitiative.org (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2008). 
154. Global Network Initiative, Core Commitments, 
http://www .globalnetworkinitiative.org/corecommitments/index. php (last visited Feb. 
5, 2010). 
155. /d. 
156. Global Network Initiative, Principles, http://www.globalnetwork 




160. Global Network Initiative, Implementation Guidelines, http://www.global 
networkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
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changing circumstances, to understand the impact of their actions. 161 
The content of a "human rights impact assessment" is left somewhat 
vague. There are no specific timelines for reporting back to the GNI, 
and the criteria for what should be reported is fairly open. 162 The 
guidelines do encourage companies to press governments for the legal 
grounds for their requests. However, the language is still very open: 
participating companies "will encourage governments to be specific, 
transparent and consistent in the demands, laws and regulations 
• • • • "
163 Additionally, the Implementation Guidelines ask that 
"[p]articipants will also encourage government demands that are 
consistent with international laws and standards on freedom of 
expression." 164 
The third core commitment and accompanying document is to 
Govemance, Accountability, & Leaming. 165 The most interesting part 
of this section is the timeline for accountability. From 2009-2010, 
Phase One: Building Capacity allows companies to continue to self-
regulate, making only annual reports to the GNI. 166 In 2011, Phase Two 
will begin which will involve a process of independent assessment to 
"review and evaluate" the internal systems of each GNI participant to 
ensure compliance with the Principles. 167 By 2012, in Phase Three, the 
GNI will begin accrediting a pool of independent assessors who "will 
prepare detailed reports explaining each company's responses to 
specific government demands" among other things. 168 At this point, the 
161. /d. 
162. For example, the document recommends that human rights impact 
assessments should be employed when companies engage in the following practices: 
ld 
Reviewing and revising internal procedures for responding to government 
demands for user data or content restrictions in existing markets. 
Entering new markets, particularly those where freedom of expression and 
privacy are not well protected. 
Reviewing the policies, procedures and activities of potential partners, 
investments, suppliers and other relevant related parties for protecting 
freedom of expression and privacy as part of its corporate due diligence 
process. 
Designing and introducing new technologies, products and services. 
163. Id 
164. /d. 
165. Global Network Initiative, Governance, Accountability & Learning 
Framework, http://www .globalnetworkinitiative.org/governanceframework/index. php 
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assessors will be reporting back to the Board of the GNI, which will 
make the final call on whether a given company's actions are compliant 
with the principles. 169 
The response to the creation of the GNI has been tepid. 170 The 
most substantive criticism of the GNI is that after two years of intensive 
talks, consulting with politicians, the involvement of the most 
prominent members of both the ISP world and the academic and human 
rights communities, the best that anyone could come up with a series of 
noncommittal, overboard policy goals characterized by an 
overabundance of unpersuasive clauses like "should" and "are 
encouraged to." 171 While several of the politicians involved in getting 
the GNI off the ground released press statements supporting the GNI, 172 
not everyone was happy with the result. 173 
The status quo has remained self-regulation. 174 Indeed, no 
independent assessment by the GNI is even scheduled until 2011, 
169. /d. These core commitments are carried out by the group's stakeholders, 
which include the ISP companies and non-profits discussed earlier. See Global Network 
Initiative, Participants, http://www .globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/index. php 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2010). In addition to the human rights non-profits and academics 
that were active in the creation of the GNI, the members also include socially 
responsible investment firms like the Calvert Group and Trillium Asset Management. 
/d. The only governmental participant is a United Nations Special Representative to the 
Secretary-General on Business & Human Rights, who has observer status. /d. 
170. See James Eagle, Wired Blog: Just a PR Exercise?, MoRNING STAR 
(BRITAIN), Oct. 31, 2008, http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/index.php/news/ 
content/view/full/67643; Miguel Helft & John Markoff, Big Tech Companies Back 
Global Plan to Shield Online Speech, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 28, 2008, at B8 (ending with 
scathing criticism of the GNI by human rights organizations); Cyrus Farivar, Global 
Initiative Promises to Harmonize ICT and Human Rights: But How Much Leverage 
Will the GNI Actually Have?, http:l/machinist.salon.cornltech/machinist/blog/2008/10/ 
29/gni (Oct. 29, 2008, 10:30). 
171. See Farivar, supra note 170. Since its formation in October, the main 
action that GNI appears to have taken has been to hold a public forum in December, in 
conjunction with the International Seminar on Business and Human Rights in 
celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
GNI SuccessfUlly Holds First Public Forum, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, Dec. 18, 
2008, http: I lwww. globalnetworkinitiative. org/newsandevents/GNI_ Successfully _Holds 
_First_ Public _Forum.php. It has also created several blog-style press releases. See 
Global Network Initiative, News and Events, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/ 
newsandevents/index.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
172. Sens. Leahy and Durbin and Rep. Berman Issue Statements in Support of 
the Global Network Initiative, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, Oct. 29, 2008, 
http: I !www. globalnetworkinitiative. org/newsandevents/Sen _Dick_ Durbin_ and_ Rep_ Ho 
ward_Berman.php. 
173. See Greg Piper, Code of Conduct Requires Companies to Press 
Governments for Legal Grounds, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Oct. 29, 2008. 
174. Jeffrey Rosen, Google 's Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at 
MM50. 
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though the participants are required to make annual reports to the 
GNI.t7s 
The story of the rise and fall of the issue of corporate complicity 
with foreign censorship, though, could have been a new governance 
success. The story went like this: corporations collaborated with 
repressive governments in a way that angered the public and deeply 
concerned Congress and the State Department. A public outcry ensued, 
Congressional hearings were held, and the threat of legislation and 
regulation was dangled over the heads of the offending companies. 
Desperate to avoid government regulation and not wanting to lose the 
valuable Chinese market, the companies undertook a series of reforms 
of behavior in close collaboration with the relevant NGOs. And the 
resulting governance mechanism-the Global Network Initiative 
actually looks a lot like a new governance model. 176 Indeed, policy-
makers could have made the GNI a government-sanctioned entity, as 
they have done with other self-regulatory organizations. 177 
For example, the GNI's system of accountability arguably 
resembles the top-down model of new governance seen in the EU, in 
which guidelines and objectives are set at the EU level, which are built 
upon and implemented by Member States. 178 In this analogy, the GNI's 
Principles are the overarching guidelines and objectives, and each 
company's internal policy to comply with and implement the principles 
are equivalent to the actions by EU Member States. However, this is 
far from a perfect match-the EU is, of course, a governing political 
body, rather than a loose coalition of corporate, non-profit, and 
academic stakeholders. 179 
The main problem with the result is the conspicuous absence of 
any governmental players in the GNI group of stakeholders to allow 
public values and foreign policy interests to enter into the equation on 
an ongoing basis. The interactions among Congress, the State 
Department, private ISP companies, academic research organizations, 
175. See Governance, Accountability & Learning Framework, supra note 165. 
176. Thanks to Alison Lerner for thoughts on this analogy. 
177. See Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisner, The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-
Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose, 
in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 127 (David Moss & John Cisterino eds., 2009) 
(describing such self-regulatory organizations). 
178. Solomon, supra note 5, at 824. 
179. Of the twenty-four participants in the GNI as of this writing, fully half of 
them are high-profile and well-funded non-profit and academic organizations such as 
Human Rights Watch, the Berkman Center, the Center for Democracy and Technology, 
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation that were active during the 1990s and 2000s in 
monitoring and publicizing the activities of the Chinese government. See Global 
Network Initiative, supra note 169. 
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and non-profit human rights and Internet freedom groups could easily 
have resulted in a very collaborative, flexible coalition similar to the 
GNI, but with the crucial inclusion of a supervising governing body. 
The OGIF, based in the State Department and as proposed by the 
GOFA legislation, would have been uniquely suited to that goal. 
Indeed, a host of commentators and scholars suggested solutions along 
these lines, though none ever actually used the phrase "new 
governance. "180 
Ill. BLURRING BOUNDARIES WITH NEW GOVERNANCE: PRESCRIPTIONS 
FOR POLICY-MAKERS-PREEMPTIVE SELF-REGULATION'S 
OPPORTUNITY FOR NEW GOVERNANCE 
Having provided a sense of the push and pull between self-
regulatory and more state-centered approaches in these case studies 
involving new issues for regulation, I also discussed the case studies as 
missed opportunities for new governance, and outlined how new 
governance approaches that embrace the idea of blurred boundaries 
among the roles and functions of different actors might work in each 
domain. In doing so, I aimed to offer advice for third-way policy-
makers on future issues. Where much of the literature approaches the 
question as one of optimal institutional design, this Article adopts more 
of a posture of institutional adaptation, looking at how regulatory 
dilemmas arise and considering how new governance features can 
emerge from private ordering. 
As someone who believes that this kind of new governance 
approach is good, my advice to policy-makers is simple. To borrow 
from and paraphrase the former Republican vice-presidential candidate 
and Governor of Alaska Sarah Palin, "Blur, baby, blur. "181 The idea 
here is that policy-makers could have strengthened desirable features of 
new governance like transparency, benchmarking and monitoring-thus 
"capturing" the self-regulation-while still enlisting the industries 
themselves to do much of the work. 
180. See generally Elaine Chen, Global Internet Freedom: Can Censorship and 
Freedom Coexist?, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & PoL'Y 229 (2003) (arguing 
for either the direct creation of OGIF as envisioned by GOFA or some similar body); 
Kristen Farrell, Corporate Complicity in the Chinese Censorship Regime: U1Jen 
Freedom of Expression and Profitability Collide, 11 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2008) (same); 
Marc D. Nawyn, Code Red: Responding to the Moral Hazards Facing U.S. 
Information Technology Companies in China, 2007 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 505 (2007) 
(same). Nawyn proposes a "hybrid solution" which fits the new governance model the 
closest. !d. at 554-62. 
181. See SARAH PALIN, GOING ROGUE: AN AMERICAN LIFE 105, 243, 273, 310 
(2009) (describing her success in popularizing the phrase "drill, baby, drill" as 
shorthand for Republican energy policy). 
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The key to understanding how such an approach might emerge is 
to see the opportunity created by the preemptive self-regulation by 
industry on a new issue facing potential regulation. Essentially, the 
industry creates a new regulatory architecture that can then be captured 
by regulators for a new governance regulatory regime with blurred 
boundaries of the kind I have described. So I pause here to flesh out 
this observation a bit, in part by revisiting the case studies, before 
concluding. 
Each of the three case studies in Part II involved a dynamic more 
or less like the following: (1) an issue not previously subject to 
regulation became a matter of public concern; (2) policy-makers 
became interested in addressing the issue, and proposed various forms 
of regulation; (3) in an attempt to ward off such government regulation, 
the industry announces a new regulatory architecture of its own to 
address the problem. It is this last step that I am calling "preemptive 
self-regulation. " 182 
The question for policy-makers at this stage, then, is this: is self-
regulation enough? It is unlikely that policy-makers address this 
question directly, though. As a practical matter, the self-regulation 
frequently acts to deflate the concern, at least among elites, and the 
industry's political influence-whether it is the data brokers, beverage 
companies, or ISPs-also serves to stave off more robust government 
regulation. 
In this context, blurring boundaries is political strategy for 
progressive or third-way policy-makers, designed to achieve "half a 
loaf' of regulation when the full loaf is politically implausible. But it is 
also a partial answer to the limits of government agencies-enlisting 
private-sector entities to do monitoring and enforcement helps address 
the scarce resource problem. And as new governance theorists have 
pointed out, it may also be an answer to other regulatory dilemmas 
such as the inherent uncertainties about how to best solve problems. 183 
182. Edward Balleisen and Marc Eisner refer to this as a well-established and 
crucial "tactic in the politics of deflection." See Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 177, at 
131 ("Whenever some comer of the business community faces a groundswell of 
popular support for regulations that will impinge on its commercial practices, the odds 
are good that its leaders will champion some form of industry-wide regulatory self-
governance as a means to forestall more onerous rule making and enforcement by the 
state."). 
183. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, "New Governance" in Legal Thought 
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. 
REv. 471, 484 (2004) ("Writings of the 'democratic experimentalist' camp, in 
particular, emphasize the inherent and inescapable epistemic constraints that limit our 
ability to map and devise comprehensive solutions to complex and dynamic social 
problems, militating in favor of a regulatory architecture that embraces the 
provisionality, revisability, and experimental character of all policy determinations."). 
624 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
The term "agency capture" is commonly used to describe an 
industry exerting undue influence over the administrative agency that is 
supposed to be regulating its activity and essentially "capturing" the 
public agency for its own ends. But we might think of this as an 
example of "industry capture" -where the government enlists the 
industry to perform public regulatory functions, capturing private-
sector entities like the Individual Reference Services Group for the 
data-broker industry, a partnership between the Alliance for a Healthier 
Generation of beverage industry on childhood obesity, and the Global 
Network Initiative set up to provide guidelines for Internet service 
providers trying to balance free-speech principles with complying with 
foreign laws. 184 
Policy-makers can take advantage of this kind of "industry 
capture" approach to avoid the result in the three case studies-classic 
examples of preemptive self-regulation that served to take the issue off 
the public agenda for the foreseeable future, leaving no public 
regulatory regime in place. Instead, by blurring the boundaries between 
the roles and functions of the public and private sectors in regulation, 
policy-makers can create a new governance regulatory regime with the 
flexibility to adjust to problems as they arise, and with the necessary 
"buy-in" from the private sector to encourage cooperation. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
After laying out the conceptual frame of "blurring boundaries" in 
Part I, this Article has tried in Parts II and III to think through the 
options facing policy-makers in "real time." That is to say, regulatory 
design rarely takes place on a blank slate, even for issues that have not 
previously been subject to regulation like the ones I discuss in the case 
184. Related ideas in the literature include "enforced self-regulation," see 
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 101-32; mandated self-regulation, see EUGENE 
BARDACH & ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY 
UNREASONABLENESS 224-26 (2002); and "meta-regulation," see Christine Parker, 
Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE 
NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSffiiLITY AND THE LAW 
207, 210-13 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007). See also Colin Scott, Self-Regulation 
and the Meta-Regulatory State, in REFRAMING SELF-REGULATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE 
LAW 131, 136-40 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006) (providing "a taxonomy of the different 
forms of relationship between state actors and self-regulatory regimes"). 
I invent and use this new term of "industry capture" to refer to the distinct idea 
that there is this existing private-sector regulatory architecture which the public sector 
uses for its own ends. Another related idea is that of delegating regulatory authority to 
firms, explored in Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Finns, 
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 
377-78 (2006). 
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studies. Thinking through how new governance approaches can emerge 
from the dynamic politics of agenda-setting and the subsequent debate 
over possible regulatory approaches can help to both identify the 
circumstances where new governance is likely to succeed, and broaden 
those circumstances. 
A central theme of Ayres and Braithwaite's Responsive Regulation 
is that there is no such thing as an ahistorical optimal regulatory 
strategy. 185 But in most circumstances, blurring boundaries may well be 
an optimal regulatory strategy, even though it does not constitute a full 
regulatory approach. 
If new governance scholars have a theory about how to capture 
self-regulation and other regulatory approaches in order to promote the 
desiderata of transparency, benchmarking, and deliberation associated 
with new governance approaches, then policy-makers may be able to 
scale up "new governance" approaches in the U.S. in a way that has 
not been possible thus far. This Article has aimed to contribute to that 
project. 
185. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 5 ("[T]he best [regulatory] 
strategy is shown to depend on context, regulatory culture, and history."). 
